URGENT — VOTE NO ON 8 JULY 2026 · NPV GROUP A/S & ENGHAVE BRYGGE INVEST ApS · ISINs SE0019914383, SE0013233293
Investor Warning Notice · Dossier #001
The same CEO who wiped out DKK 863 million in 2013 is now stripping €1.04 billion in secured bonds from investors. The vote deadline is 8 July 2026. This dossier documents the criminal pattern and the Swiss financial intermediaries who profit from it.
Subject
Jens Schaumann
"Korkprop"
Danish for "the cork that always bobs back up while creditors drown."
Asset Flow
Secured Bonds
€1.04bn · 9% coupon
DANER Equity
Stripped of pledges
INPV Control
47% econ · 90% votes
Zero Recovery
Issuer-admitted
Vote closes 8 July 2026 · 12:00 CET
Section 01 · Criminal Pattern
Two collapses, thirteen years apart, same CEO, same script. Below: the 2013 Schaumann Properties bankruptcy versus the 2024–2026 NPV Group conversion, line for line.
| Pattern Element | Schaumann Properties (2008–2013) | NPV Group (2024–2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Can't pay interest | “Insufficient liquidity to continuously pay interest expenses” | June 2026 cash interest waived & capitalized into conversion |
| Serial maturity extensions | Continuous restructuring with 8 of 10 banks | Dec 2025 extension → Jan 2026 restructuring → conversion to 2027/2028 |
| Interest capitalization | Interest rolled into debt obligations | June 2026 interest payment waived and capitalized |
| Blame external markets | “The financial crisis and resulting difficult conditions” | “Perfect storm” of costs, rates, reduced financing |
| German distraction | Berlin Scandic Hotel sold 2011 to buy time | PPF/SNG Holding pitched as “stable income” while Danish parent collapses |
| Equity destruction | DKK 1.1bn → negative DKK 863m in 5 years | 36% equity decline in 2024; solvency 6.9–11% (borderline insolvent) |
| Management control | Schaumann CEO until bankruptcy filing | INPV retains 47% + 10× voting rights = 90% control post-conversion |
| Security erosion | Collateral eroded through bank restructuring | Complete release of all Transaction Security — bondholders asked to surrender voluntarily |
| Final outcome | BANKRUPTCY — state absorbed hundreds of millions in losses | PENDING — vote 8 July 2026 |
The critical difference between 2013 and 2026: in 2013, Schaumann faced banks and the Danish state, which absorbed losses passively. In 2026, he faces bondholders who have a vote and legal remedies — but only if they act before 8 July 2026.
Section 02 · The Mechanism
A trade dressed as a rescue. Senior secured bonds with 9% coupons are exchanged for non-controlling preferred shares in a holding vehicle Schaumann's INPV will dominate.
DKK 1.04bn in secured bonds (SE0019914383, SE0013233293) with 9% coupons, senior-secured status, share pledges and collateral.
Preferred shares in DANER ApS — 53% economic interest but only 1 vote per share.
47% economic interest with 10× super-voting A-shares = 90% total voting control.
Result
Bondholders have zero say. INPV can unilaterally amend articles, remove the board observer, suspend the DKK 2M distribution cap, and initiate winding-up.
Flaw 01
INPV controls 90% of votes with only 47% economic interest.
Flaw 02
All “protections” exist only in articles unilaterally amendable by INPV.
Flaw 03
No voting rights; automatically lapses after 4 years.
Flaw 04
Management estimate, no independent valuation. Sibeliusgade local plan blocked by Copenhagen Feb 2026; Fuglekvarteret Nord inflated ~50%.
Flaw 05
DKK 374M gap remains as equity with no guaranteed return.
Flaw 06
DKK 2.0bn equity claim never audited or independently reviewed.
Flaw 07
All share pledges and Transaction Security released for ZERO compensation.
Flaw 08
Issuer may waive the Cross-Conversion Condition at its sole discretion.
Flaw 09
DKK 2M cap easily bypassed through management fees and related-party transactions.
Flaw 10
CSC Sweden: “NO DUE DILIGENCE CARRIED OUT… no due diligence whatsoever.”
Section 03 · Swiss Connection
After years of defaulted and restructured bond issues across Sweden and Denmark, JOOL rebranded as VINGA and opened offices in Geneva, Zurich and Pfäffikon to access a fresh Swiss investor base. The same partner group is now soliciting Swiss bondholders to vote through the NPV conversion.
NPV Group × VINGA — Financial Scheme Orchestrators
The proposal in front of bondholders is not an act of nature. It is being orchestrated by a coordinated group of named scheme operators — the issuer's CEO on one side, and the same VINGA (ex-JOOL) deal team on the other — who, in our view, are jointly engaged in the persuasion of investors into a structure that mirrors prior fraudulent activities attributed to the same CEO.
The pattern this group is jointly executing is publicly documented in the transaction terms: extend the maturities, then cut the coupon close to zero, then convert the bonds into non-controlling preferred equity — leaving bondholders exposed to a default that follows. It is the same sequence Jens Schaumann ran at Schaumann Properties A/S before its 2013 collapse, and VINGA is structuring and soliciting it again.
From VINGA's own website
“Vinga was founded by the JOOL Group, a family-owned corporate group firmly rooted in Swedish industrial tradition.”
SEK 955m default
Multiple property-group companies issued bonds via JOOL. Now in default. (Affärsvärlden: “Jools race mot klockan”.)
SEK 400m issue
2020 bond issue via JOOL Corporate Finance. Massive financial risks, structural subordination, dependency on subsidiary dividends.
€100m+ bonds
Bond financing arranged by VINGA. Conversion now proposed that strips all security.
CEO, NPV Group A/S
Founder and chief executive of NPV Group. Previously CEO of Schaumann Properties A/S, the Danish property group that defaulted in 2013 wiping out DKK 863m of bondholder capital. Founded NPV Group in 2011 while Schaumann Properties was still in liquidation.
Now proposing — for the second time in his career — to extend maturities, cut coupons toward zero, and convert senior secured bonds into non-controlling preferred equity ahead of a likely default.
Partner, VINGA
Senior partner at VINGA (ex-JOOL). Part of the partnership group behind the firm's debt-origination franchise that placed NPV bonds with European investors and is now soliciting the conversion proposal on the issuer's behalf.
Same firm that originated the bonds is now paid again to dismantle the security originally sold to investors.
Partner, VINGA
Partner at VINGA (ex-JOOL). Co-architect of the issuer-side franchise that marketed NPV bonds as “senior secured” and is now coordinating a conversion that releases that very security.
Origination fees on the way in, advisory fees on the way out — investors carry the loss between the two.
Partner & CEO, VINGA Swiss Branch
20+ years international investment banking. Previously 10 years at Société Générale Corporate Investment Banking (SGCIB) advising institutional investors in Switzerland and Emerging Markets.
As CEO of the Swiss branch, oversees VINGA Securities AG's operations in Geneva, Zurich and Pfäffikon — the conduit through which NPV bonds were placed with Swiss investors via custodians such as Banque Pictet & Cie SA.
Institutional Sales, VINGA Swiss Office
Front-line institutional contact in VINGA's Swiss office. Direct point of contact for family offices, private banks and asset managers — first persuading them into the NPV position and now into the conversion vote.
The voice on the phone for the Swiss bondholder base. Every “senior secured” pitch and every conversion talking point passes through this seat.
Head of Debt Capital Markets & Partner, VINGA Corporate Finance
Directly responsible for NPV Group's debt financing. Arranged the “senior secured” bonds that bondholders are now being asked to convert into non-controlling preferred shares — the same pattern Jens Schaumann ran in 2013.
Listed on VINGA Corporate Finance as the key DCM contact for NPV. Originated the structure; VINGA now acts as solicitation agent for the conversion that strips the security they marketed.
The Swiss investor angle
VINGA opened its Geneva office to onboard new investors after its Nordic track record — defaults, restructurings, regulatory scrutiny — made it harder to raise capital at home. Swiss bondholders are now being asked to underwrite the same scheme operators' next conversion.
Section 04 · Evidence Locker
Four statutory frameworks, four routes to unwind this transaction. Each citation below is a concrete cause of action, not commentary.
Danish Penal Code § 283
ExhibitDanish Insolvency Act
ExhibitDanish Companies Act
ExhibitSwedish Law
ExhibitSection 05 · Coordinated Action
A cross-border bondholder coalition has formed and is filing coordinated complaints with Danish and Swedish financial authorities to stop the NPV Group × VINGA scheme operators from acting on the 8 July 2026 vote.
120+
Bondholders coordinating
Family offices, private banks and asset managers across CH, SE, DK, LU, DE.
€340M+
Notional already aligned
Aggregate NPV exposure committed to vote NO and join regulatory action.
7
Formal complaints filed
Lodged with Danish and Swedish financial authorities against NPV Group and VINGA entities.
2
Criminal referrals prepared
SØIK (Denmark) and Ekobrottsmyndigheten (Sweden) — targeting the orchestrators personally.
Join the coalition
If you hold SE0019914383 or SE0013233293, add your name to the coordinated complaint and vote-NO list. The blocking threshold is >33.33% of participating votes — every holding counts.
Finansinspektionen
Sweden
Finanstilsynet
Denmark
Forbrugerombudsmanden
Denmark
Ekobrottsmyndigheten (EBM)
Sweden
SØIK / Danish Police
Denmark
Section 06 · Act Now
Countdown · 8 July 2026 · 12:00 CET
SE0019914383 and SE0013233293. Submit before your custodian's internal cut-off — typically 24–72 hours ahead of the official 8 July 12:00 CET deadline.
Banque Pictet, Société Générale, UBS, Julius Baer — call your relationship manager and register your NO vote in writing.
The blocking threshold is >33.33% of participating votes. Forward to every NPV bondholder, family office and adviser you know.
Swiss investors: contact FINMA and Finansinspektionen. Reference Vinga Securities AG and CSC Sweden's “no due diligence” admission.
Retain all correspondence with Longitude Asset Management, Vinga/JOOL and Pictet. Future clawback actions depend on it.
Section 07 · Wall of Shame
A consistent pattern: place high-yield Nordic real estate bonds with international investors, collect fees, then facilitate restructurings that favor issuers over bondholders.
Coercive debt-to-equity conversion stripping all security. Vote 8 July 2026.
Multiple JOOL-originated property bonds in default.
High risk, structural subordination, extension options.
Bond financing via VINGA.
VINGA (ex-JOOL) is not an independent advisor to investors. They are a placement agent paid by issuers. They originate the bonds, collect fees, and when the issuer faces distress, they switch sides to “solicit” votes for the issuer's restructuring. This is a fundamental conflict of interest that Swiss and European investors must understand.
Dossier · PDF downloads
Amplify
Media · Bondholder coordination
Contact form available on request — protected channel for whistleblowers and aggrieved bondholders.